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Abstract
For a secret sharing scheme, two parameters dmin and dcheat are
defined in [12] and [13]. These two parameters measure the error-
correcting capability and the secret-recovering capability of the se-
cret sharing scheme against cheaters. Some general properties of the
parameters have been studied in [12],[9] and [13]. The MDS secret-
sharing scheme was defined in [13] and it was proved that MDS per-
fect secret sharing scheme can be constructed for any monotone access
structure. The famous Shamir (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme
is the MDS with dmin = dcheat = n − k + 1. In [3] we proposed
the linear secret sharing scheme from algebraic-geometric codes. In
this paper the linear secret sharing scheme from AG-codes on elliptic
curves is studied and it is shown that many of them are MDS linear
secret sharing scheme.
1
Index Terms—Secret-sharing scheme, MDS secret sharing scheme,
AG-code, elliptic curve
I. Introduction and Preliminaries
In a secret-sharing scheme among the set of players P = {P1, ..., Pn}, a
dealer P0, not in P, has a secret, the dealer distributes the secret among P
such that only the qualified subsets of players P can reconstruct the secret
from their shares. The access structure , Γ ⊂ 2P, of a secret-sharing scheme
is the family of the qualified subsets of P. The minimum accesss structure
minΓ ⊂ 2P is defined to the be the set of minimal elements in Γ(here we
use the natural order relation S1 < S2 if and only if S1 ⊂ S2 on 2
P). We
call a secret-sharing scheme a (k, n)-threshold scheme if the access structure
consists of the subset of at least k elements in the set P, where the number
of elements in the set P is exactly n, that is, among the n players any subset
of k or more than k players can reconstruct the secret. The first secrets-
sharing scheme was given independently by Blakley [2] and Shamir [15] in
1979, actually they gave threshold secret-sharing scheme. We call a secret-
sharing scheme perfect if the the unqualified subsets of players to reconstruct
the secret have no information of the secret. The existence of secret-sharing
schemes with arbitrary given access structures was proved in [1] and [8]. Let
K be a finite field, we refer to [4] for the definition of linear secret sharing
scheme (LSSS) over K (K-LSSS) and its relation with linear error-correcting
codes.
For a secret-sharing scheme, we denote the set of all possible shares
(v1, ..., vn) (Here vi is the share of the player Pi for i = 1, ..., n)by V. Then
V is a error-correcting code(not necessarily linear), let dmin be the mini-
mum Hamming distance of this error-correcting code V. From the error-
correcting capability, it is clear that the cheaters can be identified from any
share(presented by the players)(v1, ..., vn) if there are at most [(dmin − 1]/2]
cheaters. In [12] McEliece and Sarwate proved that dmin = n − k + 1 for
Shamir’s (k, n)-threshold scheme. K.Okada and K.Kurosawa introduced an-
ther parameter dcheat for general secret-sharing scheme, as the the number
such that the correct secret value s can be recovered if there are at most
[(dcheat − 1)/2] cheaters (see [13]). It is clear that dmin ≤ dcheat. In [13]
the authors proved dcheat = n − maxB∈(2P−Γ)|B|, where |B| is the number
of the elements in the set B. The secret sharing scheme is called MDS if
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dmin = dcheat = n−maxB∈(2P−Γ). It was also proved in [13] that any mono-
tone access structure can be realized by a perfect MDS secret scheme.
The approach of secret-sharing based on error-correcting codes was stud-
ied in [4],[5],[9],[10],[11] and [12]. It is found that actually Shamir’s (k, n)-
threshold scheme is just the secret-sharing scheme based on the famous Reed-
Solomon (RS) code. The error-correcting code based secret-sharing scheme
is defined as follow. Here we suppose C is a linear error-correcting code over
the finite field GF (q) (where q is a prime power) with code length n+1 and
dimension k, i.e., C is a k dimension subspace of GF (q)n+1 The Hamming
distance d(C) of this error-correcting code C is defined as follows.
d(C) = min{wt(v) : v ∈ C}
wt(v) = |{i : v = (v0, v1, ..., vn), vi 6= 0}|
,where wt(v) is called the Hamming weight of v. Let G = (gij)1≤i≤k,0≤j≤n be
the generator matrix of C, i.e., G is a k × (n+ 1) matrix in which k rows of
G is a base of the k dimension subspace C of GF (q)n+1. Suppose s is a given
secret value of the dealer P0 and the secret is shared among P = {P1, ..., Pn},
the set of n players . Let g1 = (g11, ..., gk1)
T be the 1st column of G. Chosen
a random u = (u1, ..., uk) ∈ GF (q)
k such that s = uτg0 = Σuigi0. We have
the codeword c = (c0, ..., cN) = uG, it is clear that c0 = s is the secret, then
the dealer P0 gives the i−th player Pi the ci as the share of Pi for i = 1, ..., n.
In this secret-sharing scheme the error-correcting code C is assumed to be
known to every player and the dealer. For a secret sharing scheme from
error-correcting codes, suppose that Ti : GF (q)
k −→ GF (q) is defined as
Ti(x) = x
τgi, where i = 0, ..., n and gi is the i-th column of the generator
matrix of the code C. In this form we see that the secret sharing scheme is
an ideal linear secret sharing scheme over GF (q) (GF (q)-LSSS, see [4]).
We refer the following Lemma to [5],[10] and [11].
Lemma 1 (see [5], [8] and [11]). Suppose the dual of C, C⊥ = {v =
(v0, .., vn) : Gv = 0} has no codeword of Hamming weight 1. In the above
secret-sharing scheme based on the error-correcting code C, (Pi1, ..., Pim) can
reconstruct the secret if and only if there is a codeword v = (1, 0, ..., vi1, ..., vim , ...0)
in C⊥ such that vij 6= 0 for at least one j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
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The secret reconstruction is as follows, since Gv = 0, g1 = −Σ
m
j=1vijgij ,
where gh is the h − th column of G for h = 1, ..., N . Then s = c0 = ug1 =
−uΣmj=1gij = −Σ
m
j=1vijcij .
We need recall some basic facts about algebraic-geometric codes. Let
X be an absolutely irreducible, projective and smooth curve defined over
GF (q) with genus g, D = {P0, ...Pn} be a set of GF (q)-rational points of
X and G be a GF (q)-rational divisor satisfying supp(G)
⋂
D = ∅. Let
L(G) = {f : (f)+G ≥ 0} is the linear space (over GF (q)) of all rational func-
tions with its divisor not smaller than −G and Ω(B) = {ω : (ω) ≥ B} be the
linear space of all differentials with their divisors not smaller than B. Then
the functional AG(algebraic-geometric )code CL(D,G) ∈ GF (q)
n+1 and
residual AG(algebraic-geometric) code CΩ(D,G) ∈ GF (q)
n+1 are defined.
CL(D,G) is a [n+1, k = dim(L(G)−dim(L(G−D), d ≥ n+1−deg(G)] code
over GF (q) and CΩ(D,G) is a [n+1, k = dim(Ω(G−D))−dim(Ω(G)), d ≥
deg(G)− 2g+2] code over GF (q). We know that the functional code is just
the evaluations of functions in L(G) at the set D and the residual code is
just the residues of differentials in Ω(GD) at the set D (see [16], [17] and 18]).
We also know that CL(D,G) and CΩ(D,G) are dual codes. It is known
that for a differential η that has poles at P1, ...Pn with residue 1 (there al-
ways exists such a η, see[16]) we have CΩ(D,G) = CL(D,D−G+ (η)), the
function f corresponds to the differential fη. This means that functional
codes and residue code are essentially same.
II. Main Results
Let X be an absolutely irreducible, projective and smooth curve de-
fined over GF (q) with genus g, D = {P0, ...Pn} be a set of GF (q)-rational
points of X and G be a GF (q)-rational divisor with degree m satisfying
supp(G)
⋂
D = ∅. We can have a LSSS on the n players P = {P1, ..., Pn}
from the linear code CΩ(D,G), thus we know that the reconstruction of the
secret is based from its dual code CL(D,G). For the curve of genus 0 over
GF (q), we have exactly the same LSSS as Shamir’s (k, n)-threshold scheme,
since the AG-codes over the curve of genus 0 is just the RS codes (see [16],[17]
and 18]).
The following Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 are the main results of this
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paper.
Theorem 1. For the LSSS over GF (q) from the code CΩ(D,G) we have
m− 2g + 1 ≤ dmin ≤ dcheat ≤ m+ 1.
Proof. From the theory of AG-codes ([12-14]), we know CΩ(D,G) can
be identified with CL(D,D−G+ (η)). Thus dmin is the minimum Ham-
ming weight of CL(P,D−G + (η)). We have dmin ≥ m− 2g + 1.
On the other hand any subset of P less than n − m elements is not
qualified from the fact that the minimum Hamming weight of CL(D,G)
is n + 1 − m. From the equality dcheat = n − maxB∈2P−Γ|B|, we have
dcheat ≤ n− (n−m− 1) = m+ 1. The conclusion is proved.
We need to recall the following result in [14].
Theorem 2 (see [14] and [7]). 1).Let E be an elliptic curve over GF (q)
with the group of GF (q)-rational points E(GF (q)). Then E(GF (q)) is iso-
morphic to Zn1
⊕
Zn2, where n1 is a divisor of q − 1 and n2
2) If E is supersingular, then E(GF (q)) is either
a)cyclic;
b)or Z2
⊕
Z q+1
2
;
c)or Z√q−1
⊕
Z√q−1;
d)or Z√q+1
⊕
Z√q+1.
For any given elliptic curve E over GF (q), let D′ = {g0, g1, ...gH} be
a subset of E(GF (q)) of H + 1 non-zero elements, let G = mO (O is the
point of the zero element of E(GF (q))). g0, ..., gH correspond to the rational
points P0, P1, ..., PH of E(GF (q)). In the construction, we take D = D
′ and
P = {P1, ..., PH}. We have the following result.
Theorem 3. a) Let A = {Pi1, ..., Pit} be a subset of P with t elements,
B is the element in E(GF (q)) such that the group sum of B and gi1, ..., git
is zero in the group E(GF (q)). Then Ac (Here Ac is the set P − A ) is a
qualified subset for the LSSS from CΩ(D,G) only if t ≤ m and
1) When t = m, Ac is a minimal qualified subset if and only if B = O, the
zero element of E(GF (q));
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2) When t = m− 1, Ac is a minimal qualified subset if and only if B is not
in D or B is in the set A.
b) Any subset of P of more than n−m+ 2 elements is qualified.
Proof. From the theory of AG-codes, the minimum Hamming weight of
CL(D,G) is n+ 1−m, thus A
c is a qualified subset only if t ≤ m.
We know that for any t points W1, ...,Wt in E(GF (q)) the divisor W1 +
...+Wt− tO is linear equivalent to the divisor W −O, where W is the group
sum of W1, ...,Wt in the group E(GF (q)). {Pi1 , ..., Pim}
c is a qualified subset
(therefor minimal qualified subset) if there exist a function f ∈ L(G) such
that f(Pi1) = ... = f(Pim) = 0, this means that the divisor Pi1 + ... + Pim is
linearly equivalent to G. The conclusion of a) is proved.
{Pi1 , ..., Pim−1}
c is a qualified subset if there exist a function f ∈ L(G)
such that f(Pi1) = ... = f(Pim−1) = 0, this means that the divisor Pi1 + ...+
Pim−1 +B
′ is linearly equivalent to G for some effective divisor B′. It is clear
that deg(B′) = 1 and B′ is a GF (q)-rational point in E. Thus B′ is just the
B in the condition. On the other hand we note that B 6= P0, so B has to be
in A or a point not in D. The conclusion of a) is proved.
If A is a subset of P such that |A| ≤ m − 2, the divisor G − A has its
degree deg(G−A) ≥ 2. So the corresponding system has no base point. We
can find a function in L(G−A) such that it is not zero at P0, thus we have
a codeword in CL(D,G) which is not zero at P0 and zero at all points of A.
This implies that Ac is a qualified subset. The conclusion of b) is proved.
The following Corollary is a direct result of Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. If there is a subset of P of H −m + 1 elements which is
not Ac of type 2) as in the above Theorem 3 and do not contain any subset
of H −m elements of type a) in Theorem 3, then the LSSS in Theorem 1 is
MDS (perfect) ideal secret sharing scheme.
Theorem 4. If D
⋃
{O} is a subgroup of E(GF (q)), then the ideal LSSS
in Theorem 3 is MDS.
Proof. We prove that there exist m− 1 distinct elements gi1 , ..., gim−1 in
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P such that gi1 + ... + gim−1 = −g0. First we choose 2 elements gi1 , gi2 when
m − 1 is even ( or 3 elements gi1 , gi2, gi3 when m − 1 is odd) in the group
D
⋃
{O} such that gi1 + gi2 = −g0 (gi1 + gi2 + gi3 = −g0 when m− 1 is odd).
The other m− 3 (when m− 1 is even, or m− 4 when m− 1 is odd) elements
can be taken to be pairs of elements (gij ,−gij). Since D
⋃
{O} is group, thus
the desired points can always be found.
For this subset A of m − 1 elements in P, if it is qualified we know
that B in Theorem 3 is P0, this is a contradiction to Theorem 3. We have
a subset of P of n − m + 1 elements which is not qualified. This implies
dcheat ≤ m − 1. From Theorem 1 m − 1 ≤ dmin ≤ dcheat ≤ m − 1, we have
dmin = dcheat = m− 1. The conclusion is proved.
III. Examples
Example 1. Let E be the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + 5x + 4 defined over
GF (7). Then E(GF (7)) is a cyclic group of order 10 with O the point at
infinity and P0 = (3, 2), P1 = (2, 6), P2 = (4, 2), P3 = (0, 5) P4 = (5, 0), P5 =
(0, 2), P6 = (4, 5), P7 = (2, 1), P8 = (3, 5). From an easy computation we
know that P0 is a generator of E(GF (7)) and Pi is (i + 1)P0 (in the group
operation of E(GF (7)).) We take G = 3O,D = {P0, P1, P3, P5, P7}, then the
access structure of the ideal GF (7)-LSSS from CΩ(D,G) are the following
subsets of P = {P1, P3, P5, P7}.
1) All subsets of P with 3 elements and the set P;
2) The following 6 subsets of 2 elements {P1, P7}, {P1, P3}, {P1, P5}, {P3, P5},
{P3, P7}, {P5, P7} are minimal qualified subsets.
We can check that every subset ofP of 2 elements is qualified so dcheat = 3,
it is easy to see that dmin = 2 we conclude that this ideal LSSS is not MDS.
Example 2. Let E be the elliptic curve y2 + y = x3 defined over
GF (4). This is the Hermitian curve over GF (4), it has 9 rational points
and E(GF (4)) is isomorphic to Z3
⊕
Z3. We take G = 3O, where O is the
zero element in the group E(GF (4)). Let Pij be the rational point on E cor-
responding to (i, j) in Z3
⊕
Z3. D = {P10, P01, ..., P22},P = {P01, ..., P22}.
Then the qualified subsets of P are as follows.
1) The qualified subsets of 4 elements are {P20, P21, P02}
c, {P01, P20, P22}
c,
{P11, P12, P20}
c.
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2) The qualified subsets of 5 elements are {P01, P02}
c, {P11, P22}
c, {P12, P21}
c.
3) The subsets of P of 6 elements and the set P are qualified.
The subsets in 1) and 2) are the minimal qualified subsets. It is clear
that dmin = m− 2g + 1 = 2 and dcheat = 7− 5 = 2. Thus this ideal LSSS is
MDS.
Example 3. Let E be the elliptic curve y2 + y = x3 defined over
GF (q), q = 2r. This is a super-singular elliptic curve, E(GF (q)) has 2r + 1
rational points and is isomorphic to a cyclic group when r is an odd number;
E(GF (q)) has 2r+1+2 ·2
r
2 rational points and is isomorphic to the product
of two cyclic groups of order 2
r
2 + 1 when r is an even number. We take
G = mO, where O is the zero element in the group E(GF (q)). Let D be the
set of all non-zero rational points and the point P0 be an arbitrary non-zero
point in D. From Theorem 4, the ideal LSSS over GF (q) is MDS.
For any fixed r, we can calculate the access structure as in Example 2.
Now suppose r = 3. Then the access structure can be computed as follows.
In the case over GF (8), E(GF (8)) has 9 rational points and it is a cyclic
group of order 9. Let Pi be the rational point on E corresponding to i
in Z9 = {0, 1, 2, ..., 7, 8} for i = 1, 2..., 8. Let G = 3O, where O corre-
sponds to the zero element 0 in the group E(GF (8)), D = {P1, ..., P8} and
P = {P2, ..., P8}. Then the access structure of the ideal LSSS fromCΩ(D,G)
is as follows.
1) The minimal qualified subsets of 4 elements are {P2, P3, P4}
c,{P3, P7, P8}
c,
{P4, P6, P8}
c, {P5, P6, P7}
c.
2) The minimal qualified subsets of 5 elements are {P2, P5}
c,{P2, P7}
c, {P2, P8}
c,
{P3, P6}
c, {P4, P5}
c, {P4, P7}
c, {P5, P8}
c.
3) The subsets of P of 6 elements and the set P are qualified.
IV. Conclusion
We have proved some sufficient conditions about the MDS ideal linear
secret-sharing scheme from the AG-codes on elliptic curves, which can be
thought as a natural generalization of Shamir’s (k, n)-threshold scheme(from
AG-codes on the genus 0 curve, RS codes). From the main results of this
paper many MDS ideal secret sharing schemes can be constructed. This
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demonstrates that elliptic curves, perhaps also hyper-elliptic curves, are im-
portant resource in the theory and practice of secret-sharing.
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